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Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act:

A Time for Revision'
By

WILLIAM COLBERT KEADY* & GEORGE COLVIN COCHRAN**

The Voting Rights Act of 19652 represents significant legislation that, notwithstanding certain limitations, has given
life to the fifteenth amendment. Experience under the Act,
and in particular under Section 5,3 shows that despite the assault upon our federalism, 4 affected jurisdictions have not suffered from its enactment but have in fact been strengthened
politically on account of greater electoral participation on the
part of minority voters. Furthermore, there is every reason to
believe that the beneficial effects of this legislation would inure to the advantage of all jurisdictions to which it would be
applied. The time has come to lay aside arguments concerning
which region of our country has the worst record of excluding
minorities from the political process. The Republic, given its
historical pursuit of equality, can have no greater source of
strength in the future than that deriving from the nationwide
eradication of discrimination in matters of franchise.
The purpose of this article is not to laud the Voting
* Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of

Mississippi. J.D. 1936, Washington University School of Law. Judge Keady has just
completed a three year term as a member of the Judicial Conference of the United
States.
** Professor of Law, University of Mississippi Law Center. J.D. 1964, University
of North Carolina. Professor Cochran clerked for Mr. Justice Reed in 1964-65.
The authors acknowledge, with gratitude, the invaluable assistance provided by
Judy M. Guice, Judge Keady's law clerk, in the preparation of this article.
I Copyright 0 1981 by William Colbert Keady, George Colvin Cochran, and the
University of Kentucky College of Law.
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 through 1973dd-6 (1976 & Supp. I).
3 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
4 See, e.g., Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 48 (1978)
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("§ 5 represents an 'uncommon exercise of congressional
power,'. . . and the Justice Department has conceded in testimony before Congress
that it is a 'substantial departure . . . from ordinary concepts of our federal system.' "). Accord, United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 141 (1978)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 504 (1977) (an "extraordinary remedy"); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556 (1969) ("an unusual,
and in some aspects a severe, procedure").
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Rights Act as ingeniously conceived legislation for preventing
disenfranchisement of minorities; nor is it to condemn Congress for enacting and maintaining this regional 5 legislation
based in large measure upon findings made in 1965.6 It is also
not the authors' intent to become ensnared in the ongoing dialogue concerning matters such as substantive interpretations
given Section 5 by the courts and the Attorney General.7 Furthermore, it is not the authors' wish that this discussion have
the taint of past efforts that utilized the rhetoric of "nationwide application" as a vehicle to rid Section 5 of its vitality.8
Rather, we believe there is much to be learned from the past
sixteen years and that this experience, if correctly evaluated,

clearly justifies the continuance of Section 5's preclearance requirement, a requirement, however, which should be administered by the judicial system created under article Ill of our
Constitution.
Thus, this article is designed to proffer two explicit propositions: (1) Congress should amend Section 5 to provide for
nationwide application; and (2) Section 5's procedural mechanisms should be revised to discard both a seldom used judicial
'

See note 12 infra for a compilation of covered jurisdictions.

8

For a history of events leading up to enactment, see Christopher, The Consti-

tutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1965); Cox, Constitutionality of the Proposed Voting Rights Act of 1965, 3 Hous. L. REV. 1 (1965);
Hamilton, Southern Judges and Negro Voting Rights: The JudicialApproach to the
Solution of Controversial Social Problems, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 72; Comment, Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 1966 DuKE L. J. 463. See generally City of Richmond v. United
States, 422 U.S. 358, 379-80 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 318-25 (1966). For a complete discussion of prior federal efforts to enforce the fifteenth amendment, see Derfner, RacialDiscriminationand the
Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REv. 523 (1973); Note, Federal Protection of Negro Voting Rights, 51 VA. L. REv. 1051 (1965).
" For a critical analysis of the Act as currently construed, see Thernstrom, The
Odd Evolution of the Voting Rights Act, 55 PUB. INTEREST 49 (1979); The Ghost of
Reconstruction, Wall St. J. May 22, 1979, at 26, col. 1. See also Binion, The Implementation of Section 5 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act: A Retrospective on the Role of
the Courts, 32 W. POL. Q. 154 (1979); MacCoon, The Enforcement of the
PreclearanceRequirement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 29 CATH. U.
L. REV. 107 (1979); Note, "DiscriminatoryPurpose," "Changes," and "Dilution":Recent JudicialInterpretationsof § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 51 NoTRE DAAt LAW.
333 (1975).
9 See notes 80 and 131-38 infra and accompanying text for examples of such an
effort.
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remedy and a cumbersome administrative procedure and to
replace them with a judicial remedy in the United States District Courts under conditions guaranteeing expeditious resolution of Section 5 preclearance requirements.
I.

THE OPERATION AND IMPACT OF SECTION

5

As originally enacted, Section 5 prohibited certain states

and their political subdivisions from enacting or seeking to
administer "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting,
or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect on November 1, 1964"'
without advance federal approval. 10 The Act was amended in
1970 to extend to political units that maintained a "test or
device" with respect to voting and in which less than fifty percent of the eligible voting population registered or voted in
the 1968 election. In 1975, the Act was further broadened to
9 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
'0 The term "political subdivision" encompasses all entities exercising any control over the electoral process. See 435 U.S. at 125. See also 439 U.S. at 44 (impact of
change on electoral process compatible with "control" definition).
" Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314-15.
Section 5 now provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a State or political subdivision ...
[covered under section
4] . .. shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting
different from that in force or effect on. . . [the applicable date of comparison: i.e., November 1, 1964 for jurisdictions covered in 1965; November 1,
1968 for those covered in 1970; and November 1, 1972 for those covered in
1975]... such State or subdivision may institute an action in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure
does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in [section 4(f)(2), protecting certain language minorities from denial or abridgement of their right to vote], and unless and until
the court enters such judgment no person shall be denied the right to vote
for failure to comply with such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice or procedure: Provided, That such qualification. . . has been submitted by the chief legal officer or other appropriate official of such State or
subdivision to the Attorney General and the Attorney General has not interposed an objection within sixty days after such submission .... Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three
judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of Title 28 and any
appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court.
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include jurisdictions with more than five percent language minorities that, as of November 11, 1972, had election materials
printed in English only and in which less than fifty percent of
the voting age population
registered and voted in the 1972
12
election.
presidential
With a legislative history indicating that the term "procedure" was considered "to be all-inclusive of any kind of practice" 13 relating to voting, the United States Supreme Court
has, beginning with Allen v. State Board of Elections 4 in
1969, given the Section broad and wide-ranging scope.Y5 Since
the Act was designed to preclude "the subtle, as well as the
obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race,"" Section 5
scrutiny is triggered if the change or modification has "a potential for discrimination.' 17 Thus, the purpose for enacting a
change in voting is irrelevant to a determination of whether
the state or subdivision must comply with Section 5, and federal preclearance must be had even if the legislation or other
change was enacted for the purpose of complying with the
Act. 18 Section 5 preclearance must be met whether the change
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
"Test or device" includes literacy and educational achievement tests, good moral
character requirements and voucher systems. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(c) (1976).
12 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400-02.
This change was in great measure designed to bring Texas within the preclearance
requirements. Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 406 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 196, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 17-22 (1975); S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-30 (1975).
Original coverage extended to the states of Alabama, Virginia, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, as well as to Yuma County (Arizona), Honolulu
County (Hawaii), and 39 counties in North Carolina. H.R. REP. No. 397, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1969). Coverage now extends to the states of Alaska, Arizona, Texas and
parts of California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota and Wyoming.
See 46 Fed. Reg. 879-80 (1981).
21 Voting Rights: Hearings on S. 1564 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,S9th
Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as Hearings on S. 1564] (testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach), quoted in 393 U.S. at 566.
14 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
11 See 439 U.S. at 37-42; Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 387-95 (1971).
16 393 U.S. at 565.
17 439 U.S. at 42 (emphasis in original).
" 393 U.S. at 565 n.29.
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is one in polling places, 19 candidate qualifications,2 0 boundary
24
alterations, 21 reapportionment, 22 redistricting, 23 annexations,
changes from ward to at-large elections, 25 alterations in procedures for casting write-in ballots, 6 or even with respect to a
requirement that public employees take unpaid leaves of absence when campaigning for elective office. Indeed, there
would seem to be few state actions that relate to the electoral
process that would not be subject to the proscriptions of Section 5.2

Pursuant to Section 5, voting changes are not given effect
until the political unit in question receives a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia "that such qualification, prerequisite, standard,
practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on
account of race or color."29 Alternatively, the state or political
subdivision may submit the proposed change to the Attorney
General and enforce the new voting practice if no objection to
the proposal is entered within sixty days after submission."0 If
neither action is taken prior to implementation, private parties or the Attorney General may bring suit before a local
three-judge district court to enjoin enforcement.31 In the latter instance, the sole issue to be addressed is whether the enactment is subject to Section 5; the district court is not empowered to determine whether the change has a
" E.g., 400 U.S. at 388.
Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1969); 393 U.S. at 570.
21 E.g., 400 U.S. at 388.
"E.g., Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 542 (1978); Beer v. United States, 425
U.S. 130, 133 (1976).
,3E.g., Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 531 (1973).
" 422 U.S. at 378-79.
26 E.g., 400 U.S. at 394; 393 U.S. at 569.
20 E.g.,

26

'

393 U.S. at 570.
439 U.S. at 43.

2s Cf. Roman, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Formation of an ExtraordinaryFederalRemedy, 22 Am.U. L. Rlv. 111, 131 (1972) (recommended exclusions from coverage).
29 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
30 Id.

31Id.; 393 U.S. at 558-59.
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discriminatory purpose or effect.2

The Act itself, in conjunction with a Section

5

preclearance requirement which is both "unusual, and in some

aspects

. . .

severe," 3 has produced startling results in the ju-

risdictions to which it applies. An analysis of black voter registration in the six states covered by Section 5 since its inception reveals the following dramatic increases: 4

State
Alabama
Georgia
Louisiana
Mississippi
South Carolina
Virginia

1964

1968

1971-72

1976

% Black

% Black

% Black

% Black

Registration

Registration

Registration

Registration

23.1
44.1
32.0
6.8
38.8
45.8

56.7
56.1
59.3
59.4
50.8
58.4

57.1
67.8
59.1
62.2
48.0
54.0

58.1
56.3
63.9
67.4
60.6
60.7

Data shows that in 1978 the South fared not significantly
worse, and in some instances better, than any area of the nation with regard to the difference between black and white
35
voter registration:

Area
United States
Northeast
North Central
South
West

32

% White
Registered

% Black
Registered

Difference
%B/W
Registered

63.8
63.7
68.9
61.2
60.5

57.1
52.1
64.7
56.2
55.9

6.7
11.6
4.2
5.0
4.6

393 U.S. at 558-59 n.19. For a discussion of the equitable powers of a local

three-judge court, see Berry v. Doles, 438 U.S. 190 (1978).
33 393 U.S. at 556.
" Data for 1964 and for 1971-72 was derived from Extension of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the
Senate JudiciaryComm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 658 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as
1975 Senate Hearings]. Data for 1968 was obtained from H.R. REP. No. 397, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969), while 1976 data was derived from U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, REGISTRATION AND VOTING IN

NOVEMBER 1976--JURISDICTIONS COVERED BY THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AMENDMENTS OF

1975, Table 2, series P-23, No. 74 (1978).
35 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION RE-

PORTS, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER

P-20, No. 344 (1979).

1978, Table 2, series

A
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Furthermore, preliminary information concerning 1980 registration indicates that while 8.4% fewer blacks than whites
registered throughout the entire country, the registration difference was only 6.9% in the South. 6
The extent of black voting strength is perhaps best reflected in the numbers of black elected officials within the jurisdictions subject to Section 5. From 1974 to 1980, there was
an increase of 63.5% in the number of black elected officials
nationwide.3 7 In four of the six states that have been covered
by Section 5 since 1965, however, the increases were much
higher.38 Indeed, in 1980, Mississippi had the highest number
of such officials of all states in the nation,3 9 and Louisiana was
second. 0 If the analysis is directed toward per capita black

elected officials, i.e., ratio of black elected officials to black
population, it is significant that three of the six affected states
rank among the nation's ten highest in this regard.41 Finally,
the positive impact of Section 5 is perhaps best demonstrated
by the startling fact that "a majority of white [congressional]
36

U.S.

DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION RE-

1980, Table B, series
P-20, No. 359 (Advance Report 1981).
37 In 1974 there were 2,991 black elected officials, while the number rose to 4,890
in 1980. Compare JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, 1974 ROSTER OF BLACK
ELECTED OFFICIALS (1975), reprinted in 1975 Senate Hearingsat 659-60 (2,991 black
elected officials) with JOINT CENTER FOR POLITCAL STUDIES, 1980 NATIONAL ROSTER OF
PORTS, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER

BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS

4-5 (1981) (as corrected by Errata) (4,890 black elected

officials).
8 These four states and their respective percentage increases are as follows:
Georgia, 81.8% (137 black elected officials in 1974; 249 in 1980); Louisiana, 143.6%
(149 black elected officials in 1974; 363 in 1980); Mississippi, 102.6% (191 in 1974; 387
in 1980); and South Carolina, 105.2% (116 in 1974; 238 in 1980). Compare JOINT
CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, 1974 ROSTER OF BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS (1975), re-

printed in 1975 Senate Hearings at 659-60 with JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, 1980 NATIONAL ROSTER OF BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS 4-5 (1981) (as corrected by
Errata).
'9 Mississippi

had 387 black elected officials in 1980.

JOINT CENTER FOR POLITI-

1980 NATIONAL ROSTER OF BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS 158 (1981) (as corrected by Errata).
40 Louisiana had 363 black elected officials in 1980. Id. at 123 (as corrected by
Errata).
41 A ranking of states by per capita black elected officials, from most per capita
to least per capita, reveals the following:
CAL STUDIES,

748
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BLACK PER CAPITA ELECTED OFFICIALS

State

Total Pop.
15 & Over a
(in thousands)

Black Pop.
15 & Over a
(in thousands)

Blacks as ',
Total Pop.
15 & Over

No.
of
BEO

Blacks
Per Capita
BEO

1,156
227
16
262.4
1,669.6
Ark.
1,544
261
69
402.9
585.0
D.C.
Miss. b
1,800.8
604.5
34
387
1,562
1,857
77
7
143.0
2,177.5
Ok.
La. b
2,977.3
838.1
28
363
2,309
2,621
71
7
186.1
2,685.4
Ky.
S.C. b
2,219.9
646.6
29
238
2,717
2,768
53
6
146.7
2,563.4
Conn. c
2,810
136
10
382.2
3,818.7
Mo.
2,860
284
11
812.2
7,280.6
Mich. c
2,884
238
24
686.3
2,837.5
Ala. b
2,939
28
4
82.3
1,844.2
Kan.
2,943
7
3
20.6
761.5
R.I.
2,960
10
1
29.6
3,152.0
Minn.
3,031
16
3
49.3
1,427.6
W. Va.
3,579
14
3
50.1
1,753.5
Ari. b
3,664
247
21
905.1
4,345.1
N.C. c
3,847
249
25
957.9
3,884.0
Ga. b
3,849
298
13
1,146.9
9,004.9
Ill.
3,917
6
1
23.5
1,851.3
Ore.
4,217
6
5
25.3
473.9
Nev.
4,255
186
9
791.5
8,584.5
Ohio
4,382
112
15
490.8
3,334.7
Tenn.
4,387
151
11
662.5
5,990.5
N.J.
4,441
66
7
293.1
4,224.2
Ind.
4,493
15
3
67.4
2,059.1
Colo. c
4,521
14
2
63.3
2,896.0
Wash.
4,564
14
14
63.9
465.5
Del.
4,917
6
1
29.5
2,293.1
Iowa
4,943
7
3
34.6
1,237.6
Neb.
5,240
237
7
1,241.8
17,482.4
Cal. c
5,285
20
3
105.7
3,687.3
Wisc.
Tex. b
9,734.9
1,156.6
12
196
5,901
6,237
27
4
168.4
4,770.4
Mass. c
6,273
129
8
809.2
9,582.6
Penn.
7,575
85
19
643.9
3,356.4
Md.
Va. b
4,039.8
721.6
18
91
7,930
8,073
109
13
880.0
6,702.6
Fla. c
9,693
20D
13
1,938.6
14,879.9
N.Y. c
N/A
3
N/A
N/A
286.5
Alas. b
N/A
1
N/A
N/A
717.2
Haw. c
N/A
0
N/A
N/A
640.5
Idaho c
N/A
2
N/A
N/A
841.2
Maine
N/A
0
N/A
N/A
597.0
Mont.
N/A
I
N/A
N/A
649.5
N.H. c
N/A
2
N/A
N/A
901.1
N.M.
N/A
0
N/A
N/A
511.5
N.D.
N/A
0
N/A
N/A
542.3
S.D. c
N/A
0
N/A
N/A
919.2
Utah
N/A
0
N/A
N/A
375.9
Vt.
N/A
0
N/A
N/A
299.7
Wyo. C
a) Since census data is broken down only by age 0 to 5, 5 to 14, 15 to 24, etc., population figures include those
persons age 15 to 18, even though they are ineligible to vote.
b) Entire state covered by § 5. See 46 Fed. Reg. 879-80 (1981).
c) Parts of state covered by § 5. See id.
The foregoing data is drawn from a variety of sources. Since 1980 census data was unavailable for all states,
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representatives from the American South supported"' 2 extension of the Voting Rights Act in 1975.
The preclearance mechanism has undoubtedly served to
effectuate the right of minority voters to participate in the
electoral process by identifying and preventing both obvious
and subtle attempts to prevent electoral participation solely
on the basis of race. Moreover, if preclearance were eliminated, it is probable that local and state governments would
reinstate voting procedures that would irreparably harm black
citizens and other minorities by impinging, directly or indirectly, upon their right of suffrage. The manner in which
preclearance is currently implemented, however, should be
cause for concern. The requirement should and must be extended to the remainder of the United States. In addition to
retaining this requirement that has proved so effective in a
limited portion of our country, such action would serve to insure that the proscription of disenfranchisement provided by
the fifteenth amendment becomes a reality for minority voters
nationwide.
II.

PRECLEARANCE IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA: DESIRE FOR UNIFORMITY AND MISTRUST OF

SOUTHERN JURISTS

The principal rationale offered for the original decision in
1965 to limit jurisdiction of Section 5 declaratory judgment
1980 population figures are projections derived from U.S. DEPT.OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,CURRENr
POPULATION REPORTS, ILLUSTRATIVE
PROJECTIONS
OFSTATEPOPULATIONS
BYAGE, RACE & SEx: 1975 To 2000, Table
6, kvrie3 P-25, No. 796 (1979) (series 11-C that assumes zero net interstate domestic migration since 1975). Black
population data for 1980 is unavailable for those states that had an estimated black total population in 1975 of
leI than 2.5,000. The figures regarding the numbers of black elected officials are derived from JoINT CENTERFOR
POLITICAL STUDIES, 1980 NATIONALROSTEROF BLACKELECTEDOFFICIALS
4-5 (1981) (as corrected by Errata). The
average number of blacks per black elected official in all states for which data is available is 4,185. The average for
statea that are completely covered by the Act (for which data is available) is 3,841, while the average for all states
not covered at all by the Act (for which data is available) is 3,889.
42 Black, Racial Composition of Congressional Districts and Support for Federal Voting Rights in the American South, 59 Soc. Sci. Q. 435 (1978). The author
continued:
This expression of approval represented a significant shift in the position of
the southern congressional delegation, which had long opposed any federal
regulation of voter qualifications ... and appeared to indicate the acceptance by southern white politicians of the legitimacy of participation by
blacks in the region's electoral process.
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actions to a three-judge district court in the District of Columbia was to insure uniformity of 'interpretation.13 Although
not a single suit had been filed in the court seeking a declaratory judgment concerning the purpose or effect of a voting
change,4 4 the uniformity justification was again relied upon
five years later when Section 5 was renewed as originally enacted.4 5 Congressional critics, however, began to emphasize
the weak underpinnings of the rationale. Senator Ervin, for
example, unsuccessfully seeking to divest the court of plenary
jurisdiction by means of amendment, 4 argued:
There were many specious reasons given at the time of passage of this bill for denying all courts jurisdiction except the
District Court of the District of Columbia. One was that we
needed uniform interpretation. That was a specious reason,
because we have 10 separate and distinct U.S. courts of appeals sitting in the 10 circuits handing down, in some cases,
different interpretations of the law and those interpretations
are ultimately made uniform by appeals to the Supreme
47
Court of the United States.

By the end of 1974 only five suits had been filed,48 result-

ing in three published opinions. 4 9 Despite meager judicial ac-

tivity, proponents for retention of the District of Columbia
court as the only viable judicial avenue for preclearance maintained that "the United States District Court for the District
43 See Hearingson S. 1564, supra note 13, at 69-73 (testimony of Attorney General Katzenbach). See also 111 CONG. REC. 10354-55 (remarks of Senator Hart); id. at
15663 (remarks of Congressman Celler).
4 GAO Report on the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the House Judiciary Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
184 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as GAO Report Hearings].Even though there were
no suits filed in the district court, 436 submissions to the Attorney General were
made during the same time period.
"I See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 6509 (1970) (D.C. Court insures "consistency and
uniformity" with respect to the Act's construction).
46 Id. at 6506, 6511.
'1 Id. at 6508. See also id. at 6519.
48 GAO Report Hearings,supra note 44, at 184. In stark contrast is the fact that
§ 5 had generated 4,476 administrative submissions by 1975. See Appendix, infra.
49 City of Richmond v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1344 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated,
422 U.S. 358 (1975); Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 363 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd, 425
U.S. 130 (1976); City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972),
aff'd, 410 U.S. 962 (1973).
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of Columbia [is an] expert in the area, ha[s] developed familiarity with the impact of discriminatory voting systems,"" and
"has built up a degree of expertise on the Voting Rights Act
that is invaluable." 51 The response of legislators to suggestions
that Section 5 jurisdiction be expanded to all United States
District Courts because of minimal utilization 52 of the District
of Columbia forum, however, revealed an assumption implicit
in the Act 53 as expressed by Senator Tunney of California:

I might say, in all honesty... , I think that in the area
of civil rights there is a great deal of peer pressure on judges
in the South .... I think there is a lot of peer pressure,

and I would only have to point to the fact that recently the
Supreme Court unanimously reversed a three-judge court in
Mississippi that had approved a reapportionment measure
54

The response by Senator Morgan of North Carolina to Sena50 S.

REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975).
121 CONG. REC. 24114 (1976) (remarks of Senator Tunney).
52 H.R. REP. No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Seass. 112 (1975). See also 121 CONG. REC.
24716 (1975) (proposed amendment by Senator Scott to divest District of Columbia
court of sole jurisdiction).
"I Although distrust of southern federal judges was referred to in the 1965 debates by opponents, e.g., 111 CONG. REc. 9245 (1965) (remarks of Senator Ervin),
during the 1970 renewal hearings Joseph Rauh met the issue head on. Responding to
a question concerning an alternative proposal that would allow the Attorney General
to bring suit in local federal courts for substantive violations, he stated:
What stops these things [discriminatory voting changes] now is they
have got to come for approval to the Attorney General or the district court
here, people who are sympathetic to civil rights. That wouldn't happen
under [the proposal]. Under [it] the Attorney General each time would
have to get the facts, [and] start a suit in hostile territory...
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 132
(1970) [hereinafter referred to as 1970 Senate Hearings] (testimony of Joseph L.
Rauh, Jr., General Counsel for the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights) (emphasis
added).
Indeed, in a judicial milieu in which southern judges were steadily handling an
increasing caseload of school integration and civil rights cases, 116 CONG. REc. 6166
(1970) (remarks of Senator Holland), one senator paralleled Mr. Rauh's analysis by
arguing that a decision was made to move § 5 cases "into a forum which was partially,
if not totally, predisposed to be blind and deaf to any arguments fostered by the
Southern States." Id. at 5686 (remarks of Senator Thurmond).
11121 CONG. REC. 24114-15 (1975). See also id. at 24717 (similar analysis by Senator Tunney).
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tor Tunney's implicit attack upon the competence and integrity of southern jurists was direct and emotional:
For the Senator from California... to stand here and
say that the judges - to indict the Federal judiciary in the
South, is beyond my imagination.
And for the Senator to say that just because the Supreme Court reversed a decision of a three-judge panel in
Mississippi is an indictment of the Federal judiciary in the
South which, again is beyond my comprehension, and I resent it ... I resent it."

During the House debates, Representative Kindness of
Ohio introduced an amendment to divest the District of Co-

lumbia court of sole jurisdiction. 5 His argument that there
was "no particular expertise built up"5 7 by that court was successfully countered by responses citing the "need for uniformity" and remarks making reference to the Supreme Court reversal of the three-judge court in Mississippi.5 8 There was,
however, yt another justification proffered which, until that

time, remained undisclosed. As articulated by a major advocate of retaining Section 5 without amendment:
[T]he Department of Justice desires to centralize all litigation about this matter right here in the District of Columbia.... The Department of Justice in this and other
areas of national importance feels that they should build up
a body of jurisprudence right in the District of Columbia
and it is they, more than the civil rights group, that really
want to locate this here, rather than the regional aspects.",
An examination of relevant statistical data evinces the
speciousness of this explanation and those that preceded it.
"Id. at 24725.
56 Id. at 16900.
Id.
58 Id. at 16900-01 (remarks of Congressman Edwards). For remarks typifying the
'7

scope of debate on the issue, see, e.g., id. at 16267 (Congressman Butler alleging no
expertise in District of Columbia court and "political bias" against southern judges);
id. at 16283 (Congressman Kindness claiming an insult to southern judiciary); id.
(Congressman Sieberling describing need for uniformity); id. at 16289 (Congressman
Conyers arguing that southern judges are easily intimidated).
"IId. at 16289 (remarks of Congressman Drinan).
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During the years 1975 through 1980, only eighteen suits for
declaratory relief were initiated,6 0 resulting in seven published
opinions."" Thus, after fifteen years of experience with the
Act, only twenty-three suits have been filed, ten of which resulted in published opinions. It is therefore apparent that the
quest for "uniformity" has never been realized, and the resulting "expertise" justification with respect to adjudicating "purpose or effect" transgressions can only be considered a myth. 2
More important, the pattern established by covered jurisdictions of avoiding the District of Columbia court during this
sixteen-year period' s demonstrates that there is, in fact, a
functional judicial remedy neither for those dissatisfied with
the Attorney General's decision to object nor in those situa60 Letter from Gerald W. Jones, Chief, Voting Section, to Professor George C.
Cochran (March 25, 1981); Interview with Barry Weinberg, Deputy Chief, Voting Section (June 8, 1981).
6 Hale County v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 1206 (D.D.C. 1980); Mississippi v.
United States, 490 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1979), af'd, 444 U.S. 1050 (1980); City of
Dallas v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 183 (D.D.C. 1979); Rome v. United States, 472
F. Supp. 221 (D.D.C. 1979), affd, 446 U.S. 156 (1980), rehearingdenied, 447 U.S. 916
(1980); Charlton County Bd. of Educ. v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 530 (D.D.C.
1978); Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd, 439
U.S. 999 (1979); Horry County v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1978).
62 At the present time, however, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals pays homage to the "uniformity" rationale. Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53, 72
(D.C. Cir. 1975). Furthermore, three members of the Supreme Court have adhered to
the proposition that since "frontline judicial responsibility for interpreting and applying [§ 5's] substantive standards" has been vested with the District Court for the
District of Columbia, "the considerable experience which that court has acquired...
enhances the respect to which its judgments are entitled." 422 U.S. at 381 (Brennan,
J., dissenting, joined by Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall).
In a totally unrelated area, the District of Columbia District Court has experienced a slightly increased caseload. Section 4(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)
(1976), includes a "bail out" provision that allows a jurisdiction to escape § 5 coverage by bringing a declaratory judgment action and proving that no "test or device"
has been used in the jurisdiction "during the seventeen years preceding the filing of
the action for the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
on account of race or color." Id. Pursuing an independent line of research, Justice
Powell uncovered 28 successful bailout suits brought by political subdivisions located
in states not covered by the Act. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 198
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
63 This pattern of avoidance is clearly evidenced by the startling number of administrative submissions during the period. For example, during the years 1975
through 1980, there were 30,322 administrative submissions (see Appendix infra), as
compared to only 18 suits for declaratory relief filed during the same period. Interview with Barry Weinberg, supra note 60.
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tions where jurisdictions have either refused or been unable to
submit to the preclearance process of the Department of Justice. Such factors as time, distance, expense and other logistical burdens, or a notion of the futility of invoking such a judicial remedy may, collectively or individually, compel affected
jurisdictions to refrain from utilizing an isolated segment of
the judicial system. Practically speaking, therefore, judicial review is not presently a feasible alternative.6 Consequently,
the legislative processes of over 7,000 political subdivisions 65
are now subject to the virtually unreviewable decision-making
processes within the Office of the Attorney General of the
United States. As we shall see, the history and current status
of this administrative process demonstrates the compelling
need for its elimination.
III.

ADMINISTRATIVE PRECLEARANCE: THE BIRTH AND
EVOLUTION OF A CONGRESSIONAL AFTERTHOUGHT

As originally proposed, preclearance was to be limited to
declaratory relief before a three-judge court in the District of
Columbia.66 In the wake of hearings before a House Subcommittee, however, several legislators expressed concern over the
probability of delays if this procedure were to be the sole avenue of relief for jurisdictions subject to Section 5.67 Since val" See note 143 infra for an example of a situation in which judicial review was
not chosen. See also note 181 infra and accompanying text for a discussion that reflects the view that the "politics" of administrative preclearance results in a preference by political subdivisions for that alternative. This conclusion, however, fails to
answer the question of why only 23 suits have been filed in the context of 815 objections by the Department of Justice since 1965.
" 446 U.S. at 205 n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"e S. 1564, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 111 CONG. REc. 5403-04 (1985) (the original bill
introduced).
'7 The problem was analyzed as follows:
The District Court for the District of Columbia already has a huge
backlog of over 4,000 civil cases. With the median time of 28 months required from the time of filing an action in this court to the disposition after
trial, this provision of the.., bill will contribute to a long delay in the
hearing of such cases. In the meantime, State voter qualifications and standards are suspended without relief.
H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1965) (footnotes omitted) (separate view
of Republican Representatives McCulloch, Poff, Cramer, Moore, MacGregor, King,
Hutchinson, and McClory).
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idly enacted laws would be suspended pending declaratory relief, the consensus of opinion was that if such "drastic effects
must be visited" on covered states, "resolution of this class of
cases should be handled expeditiousyl [sic]."' 8
Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Katzenbach recognized the tensions that result
from state laws being held in such a lengthy state of suspended preclearance and proffered a remedy in the following

dialogue:
Senator ERVIN. It seems to me that is a drastic power
which can hardly be reconciled with the federal system of
government....
Attorney General KATZENBACH. I think it is quite a
strong power, Senator. The effort is to prevent this constant
slowing down process which occurs when States enact new
laws that may clearly be in violation of the 15th amendment, but you have to go through the process of getting judicial determinations of that. It takes a long time. In the
interval the purposes of the act are frustrated.
Now, there may be better ways of accomplishing this. I
do not know if there are. There are some here I can imagine,
a good many provisions of State law, that could be changed
that would not in any way abridge or deny the right; ...
except for the fact that some members of committee, I
think, including yourself, have had difficulty with giving the
Attorney General discretion on some of these things - perhaps this could be improved by applying it only to those
laws which the Attorney General takes exception to within a
given period of time. Perhaps that would remove some of
the burdens. 69
Attorney General Katzenbach's suggestion of vesting the Attorney General with such discretion apparently impressed
Congress"0 for the committee bill incorporated the sixty-day
administrative preclearance provision that - without further
debate on the issue - became a permanent and the most imId.
e, Hearings on S. 1564, supra note 13, at 237 (testimony of Attorney General
Katzenbach).
70 520 F.2d at 65 (similar review of legislative history). See also Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. at 503 n.18.
88
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portant segment of the Voting Rights Act. Its inclusion may
be best described as an "afterthought,. . . a practical way to
avoid the onerous task of preparing and filing a lawsuit in the
District of Columbia. 7 1 It soon became apparent, however,
that administrative preclearance was fraught with difficulties
that were not and could not have been anticipated in 1965.
The 1970 congressional renewal hearings provided a forum for discussion of problems encountered during the first
five years of the Section's operation. The major criticisms centered around administrative burdens resulting from the unexpected number of submissions to the Department of Justice
and the potentiality that political considerations might enter
into the Department's decision-making process. With regard
to the former, Assistant Attorney General David Norman, one
of Section 5's original drafters, 72 expressed doubts as to the
"effectiveness" of administrative preclearance 73 because of the
Attorney General's inability to apply purpose or effect criteria
to current submissions,7 4 ever-increasing demands on limited
personnel to make extensive, independent investigations of all
submissions,7 5 and the deluge of inconsequential changes sub71 The Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Civil Rights
Oversight Subcomm. of the House Judiciary Comm., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1971)
[hereinafter referred to as House Oversight Hearings] (letter from Howard A. Glickstein, Staff Director, United States Commission on Civil Rights, to John N. Mitchell,
Attorney General, Nov. 3, 1970).
7 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 513 (testimony of David L. Norman,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division).
73 Id. at 514.
74 Id. at 505. In this regard, Norman stated:
The first point I want to make about section 5... is that when states
submit proposed voting changes to the Attorney General, those changes
normally come to us in the form of a statute or an ordinance. I have not
seen a statute or an ordinance which you could tell on its face, by reading
it, that its puropse [sic] or its effect was discriminatory.
Id.
I5 Id. In regard to the investigatory procedure, Norman testified:

When the statutes or ordinances are submitted to the Attorney General, we read them to determine if there is discrimination there. In order to
find out anything more about the statute or ordinance, it requires some
investigation and inquiry. In order to find out whether there is a discriminatory purpose, one might have to search through legislative journals or
newspapers. It is almost impossible to probe into the minds of legislators to
determine what purpose they had.
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mitted pursuant to the expansive interpretation accorded the
Act in Allen.7"
Prior to the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of Sec-

tion 5 set forth in Allen," neither the Department of Justice
nor affected jurisdictions were certain of the parameters of the
Section.7" The immediate impact of the ruling was therefore
significant. In 1968, the year prior to the decision, there were
only 110 submissions for preclearance to the Department; for
1970 that number had more than doubled to 255.79
Ostensibly as a response to these administrative burdens,
Attorney General Mitchell presented a Nixon Administration
bill to amend Section 5 to abrogate preclearance, both administrative and judicial, and to vest the Department of Justice
with sole power to invoke the jurisdiction of local three-judge
courts nationwide when there was "reason to believe" that a
"standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting...
has the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to

Id.

In order to determine whether there is any discriminatory effect, or a
potential discriminatory effect, we often have to interview witnesses, interview people in the communities about what they think. In order to determine the effect, we very often have to obtain maps, precinct maps, for example, when a change involves changing a precinct line.

Norman noted that "[a]mong the little known facts, I think, is that the way we
read [Allen] almost every change affecting voting has to be submitted to the Attorney
General, no matter how trivial, how wise, how beneficial a change might be, it must
be submitted." Id. at 506. See also 116 CONG. REc. 6159 (1970) (Senator Dole making
point that most submissions involve inconsequential changes).
77 See notes 14-28 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope and
impact of the Allen decision.
78 See generally MacCoon, supra note 7, at 108; Roman, supra note 28, at 12526. During the 1965-70 period, the Department devoted the most significant portion
of its time to registration matters. See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 584
(testimony of Assistant Attorney General Pottinger). See also U.S. ComM'N ON CrViL
RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT: TEN YEARS AFTER 25 (1975) [hereinafter referred to
as TEN YEAs AFTER], reprinted in Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary
Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 969-1466 (1975).
79 See Appendix infra. Furthermore, the Allen decision influenced not only the
submission process but also the review process itself. As of January 29, 1970, there
had been a total of 436 submissions since the Act's inception. Of 22 objections interposed, 18 came in the year following Allen. 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at
505 (testimony of David Norman). See also Appendix infra.
76
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vote" on the basis of race. 0 Mitchell stressed the inefficiencies

of administrative preclearance and contended that the Department not only was encountering difficulties in making informed judgments with respect to discriminatory effect"1 but
was also unable, at that time, to monitor and secure submission of all changes.8 2 Furthermore, the Attorney General argued that the need for conducting extensive investigations
prior to making a determination hindered the Department in
its effort to perform the tasks required of it under Section 5.8S
Thus, Mitchell's testimony can be perceived as an attempt to
establish two points: (1) the impropriety of vesting what is essentially a judicial function in an administrative body not accompanied by procedural or due process safeguards;4 and (2)
80 The amendment in its entirety provided:
(a) Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that a State
or political subdivision has enacted or is seeking to administer any voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure
with respect to voting which has the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, he may institute for the
United States, or in the name of the United States, an action in a district
court of the United States, in accordance with sections 1391 through 1393
of title 28, United States Code, for a restraining order or a preliminary or
permanent injunction, or such other order as he deems appropriate.
(b) An action under this section shall be heard and determined by a
court of three judges in accordance with the provision of section 2284 of
title 28 of the United States Code and any appeal shall be to the Supreme
Court.
Voting Rights Act Extension: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Judiciary Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 282 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as 1969 House
Hearings].
Couching his presentation in terms of a need to expand the Act "nationwide,"
see, e.g., id. at 238, Mitchell spent a significant amount of time attempting to defend
the amendment before unsympathetic congressional committees. See Id. at 218-45,
272-307 (1969); 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 182-212, 220-53. Despite
adversity from the committees, the Nixon proposal did secure House passage. H.&.
4249, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 38535-37 (1969).
81 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 198-99 (testimony of Attorney General Mitchell). See also 116 CoNG. REc. 6156 (1970) (Senator Gurney setting forth
argument that low rate of objections evinces the fact that the department is not adequately fulfilling its responsibilities).
82 1970 Senate Hearings, supra note 53, at 197-99 (testimony of Attorney General Mitchell). See also 116 CONG. REc. 6156 (1970) (Senator Gurney noting that jurisdictions often fail to submit changes).
83 1970 Senate Hearings,supra note 53, at 198-99 (testimony of Attorney General Mitchell).
84 See id.
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the idea that no sensitive lawmaker "would . . . have
[designed Section 5] as it [is] structured, because . . . the

processes provided under which the Attorney General must
make a decision are not adequate. They result in arbitrary decisions without sufficient information." 5
86
Congress found Mitchell's contentions unpersuasive,
perhaps in large measure on account of suspicions of legislators that considerations of a purely political nature served as
motivation for the Administration's proposal. The tenor of the
Nixon Administration and its perceived hesitancy to enforce
vigorously the Voting Rights Act 8 7 served to bring to mind

views expressed in 1965 in opposition to the Act:
[W]e view with much concern the broad discretionary powers placed in the hands of the Attorney General .... Without suggesting any criticism of the present incumbent, we

foresee a multitude of opportunities for political manipulation by an Attorney General who is inclined to do so. This is
especially true since in recent times several Attorneys General, Republican and Democrat, have been closely tied to the
political campaigns prior to their taking office. Of all the
grants of authority to the Attorney General ... ,including
the ability to consent to the entry of declaratory judgments
. . ., it does not require a great deal of imagination to see

that the authority to approve or disapprove State laws
"Id. at 204.
Reports by responsible subcommittees rejected any of Mitchell's proposals
amending § 5. See, H.R. REP. No. 397, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1969) ("The committee is convinced that section 5 procedures are an integral part of the rights afforded
by the 1965 act."). Although President Nixon argued that the administration bill was
"comprehensive and equitable," 116 CONG. REC. 5532 (1970) (letter from President
Nixon to Minority Leader Ford, Dec. 10, 1969), the debilitating aspects of the substitute were abundantly clear to various members of Congress. See, e.g., id. at 6356 (no
private suits; tedious and time-consuming litigation would ensue). A proposed
amendment by Senator Ervin to authorize suits by the Department of Justice in local
courts was also rejected. Id. at 6515-22. But see note 80 supra indicating passage of
Nixon proposal by House.
87 See e.g., House Oversight Hearings,supra note 71, at 8-9 (newspaper article in
the Baltimore Sun, May 14, 1971 at 1 concerning Attorney General Mitchell's inclination not to enforce the Act). See also NIXON, R.N.: THE MEMOIRs OF RICHARD NIXON
440 (1978) (expressed determination to terminate "punitive requirements" of civil
rights enforcement in the South); CALIFANO, GOVERNING AMERICA 214-17 (1981)
(describing debilitating effect of "Southern strategy" on civil rights enforcement).
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8
stands out as the power most subject to abuse.1

Such concerns surfaced in the disapproval of the Department's handling of Section 5 one year later when the House
Civil Rights Oversight Subcommittee held hearings in response to complaints that "the Attorney General has failed
. . . to carry out the intent of Congress, and has disregarded
recent Supreme Court decisions protecting the right of all
' At the outset,
Americans to exercise their right to vote."89
fears of political manipulation were voiced in light of the fact
that no suits had been filed with the District of Columbia
court, and it appeared more than possible to Subcommittee
members that covered jurisdictions had reason to believe they
would receive more "sympathetic consideration" from the Attorney General.9 David Norman, who one year earlier expressed concern as to Section 5's effectiveness, was again the
Administration's chief spokesman.
Norman countered the legislators' suspicions by explaining that any maladministration resulted from the increased
burdens upon the Department arising from the broad construction of Section 5 mandated by Allen and the fact that

many submissions raised complex issues dealing with "reapportionment, redistricting and . . . annexation[s]" ' 1 that
would "best be treated in the courts. '9 2 Responding to the lat-

ter point, Congressman Wiggins recalled that administrative
preclearance "was intended to permit an expeditious, prompt
response on behalf of a State submitting a relatively minor
problem and thus avoid unnecessary court delays" while it
was "contemplated that complicated issues ...

would be re-

88 116 CONG. REC. 6166 (1970) (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 439,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1965) (separate views of Republican Representatives McCulloch, Poff, Cramer, Moore, MacGregor, King, Hutchinson, and McClory)).
so House Oversight Hearings, supra note 71, at 3 (statement of Representative
Edwards). Chairman Edwards noted: "Civil rights groups claim that the Department
of Justice has abdicated its responsibility by failing to object to a single reregistration
proposal and by simply not requiring countries [sic] to submit their reregistration
plans." Id. at 2.
10 Id. at 32 (statement of Representative Waldie).
91 Id. at 7 (testimony of David Norman).
92

Id. at 10.
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solved in the District Court for the District of Columbia."' 3
Conceding that Wiggins' understanding "might have been discussed around the halls of Congress," Norman noted that
"Congress didn't authorize the Attorney General to decide
that this thing is tough and, therefore, it ought to go into
court. '94 As a solution to the problem, he noted that the Department was considering proposing an amendment to Section
5 providing for an initial clearance of submissions before hearing examiners, with judicial review in a court of appeals under
procedures authorized by the Administrative Procedures
Act. 5 Subsequently, however, a representative of the Civil
Rights Commission expressed his disapproval of this proposal
on the ground that it would "create a very time-consuming,
very dragged-out administrative procedure."9
At the close of the hearings, the House Subcommittee
could arrive at only one solution - to force political subdivisions to engage in the "onerous task of preparing and filing a
lawsuit in the District of Columbia. '9 7 This proposal mirrored
that of the Director of the Civil Rights Commission, who suggested that "when questions [of preclearance] get that complicated ... the Attorney General should just interpose .an objection and allow the [covered] jurisdiction to go to court in
93 Id. at 11 (testimony of Representative Wiggins).
94 Id. (testimony of David Norman).
I' Norman described the proposal as follows:
[Tihe Department of Justice is now developing a proposal to amend section
5 . . . in order to provide for a full-scale administrative hearing under a
hearing examiner when it is determined that a submission involves complex
issues of fact. The final determination in such a case would be subject to
judicial review in a court of appeals. We believe that such an amendment
would facilitate proper evaluation by the Attorney General of voting
changes, such as reapportionments and annexations, which require examination of complicated and often extensive demographic information.
Id. at 6. See also id. at 7 (utilization of Administrative Procedure Act).
"' Id. at 107-08 (testimony of Howard A. Glickstein, Staff Director, United
States Commission on Civil Rights). The Civil Rights Commission's director acknowl-

edged his unhappiness "with the fact that so many hours of Justice Department legal
talent has to be expended on these submissions" but noted "there would be equal
amount of Justice Department manpower spent" if the submitting jurisdictions instead brought declaratory judgment actions in the District of Columbia court. Id. at
107.
" Id. at 92.
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the District of Columbia and resolve it in [that court]." 9 s
Such an approach, however, presented the Subcommittee
with a dilemma inasmuch as this procedure could be conducive to even greater delay and therefore contrary to the Act's
purpose. This problem was resolved by the determination that
the burden should be placed upon the submitting authority
since "[c]overed jurisdictions [are] supposed to avail themselves of the faster route to preclearance only when the submitted changes [are] readily assessable as nondiscriminatory."99 Finally, the Report concluded that the Attorney
General had failed to implement properly the preclearance
procedure and that complaints of the Act's unenforceability
would subside if the burden of proof were placed squarely on
the shoulders of the submitting jurisdiction. 100 The Attorney
General's regulation placing the burden of proof upon affected
jurisdictions utilizing the administrative preclearance procedure,'' as in declaratory judgment suits in the District of Columbia court,10 2 was subsequently upheld by the Supreme

Court in Georgia v. United States.10 3
A predominant concern raised during the course of the
1975 renewal hearings was the level of compliance with Section 5 within affected jurisdictions. In preparation for the re" Id. at 108. See also ENFORCEMENT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT oF 1965 IN MISsissippi: A REPORT OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS OVERSIGHT SuBcoMMirrrE OF THE HoUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (Comm. Print 1972).
go ENFORCEMENT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT OF 1965 IN Mississippi: A REPORT OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS OVERSIGHT SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY Coii.rrEE,
92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (Comm. Print 1972).
"I0Id. at 7. Specifically criticized were the "impartial administration" test applied to voting changes and the failure of the Department to incorporate therein a
"rebuttable presumption" that all submissions were discriminatory. Id. at 7-8.
101 The Department regulation regarding burden of proof provides in pertinent
part:
[T]he burden of proof on the submitting authority is the same in submitting changes to the Attorney General as it would be in submitting changes
to the District Court for the District of Columbia .... If the evidence as to
the purpose or effect of the change is conflicting, and the Attorney General
is unable to resolve the conflict within the 60-day period, he shall, consistent with the above-described burden of proof applicable in the District
Court, enter an objection and so notify the submitting authority.
46 Fed. Reg. 878 (1981).
102 383 U.S. at 335 (1966).
103 411 U.S. 526, 538-39 (1973).
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newal hearings, the United States Commission on Civil Rights
submitted a detailed report to the President on the status and
impact of the Act.104 The Commission concurred in former Attorney General Mitchell's allegation that substantial noncompliance existed:
Although jurisdictions have been in substantially greater
compliance in the second 5 years than they were in the first
5 years of the act, review of the Justice Department's May
1974 computer printout reveals that a large number of counties have never made any submissions under section 5. Spot
checks by Commission staff indicate that in some cases, at
least, changes have been made but not submitted or reviewed. Noncompliance with the Voting Rights Act through
failure to submit changes remains a problem in enforcement

of the act.103

In light of these findings, the Commission recommended
that Section 5 be extended because, inter alia, "[e]ven now
some jurisdictions either are not fully aware of or fail to comply with its requirements."1 0- In addition to recommending
that the Department take immediate steps to insure compliance,10 7 the Commission deemed appropriate an amendment

of Section 5 to provide for civil penalties 1 and an award of
I

TEN YEARS AFTER, supra note 78.

106 Id. at 28 (footnote omitted).
10 Id. at 345.
107 The recommendation was as follows:

The Department of Justice should assume the responsibility for developing a system which ensures the discovery and systematic review of election law changes. The Department also should take legal action to prevent
the implementation of uncleared changes and give greater publicity to the
requirements of section 5 to increase the timely submission of changes for
the Attorney General's review.
Id. at 347.
108 The report stated:

Congress should amend the Voting Rights Act to provide for civil penalties or damages against State and local officials who violate section 5 of
the act by enforcing or implementing changes in their electoral laws and
procedures without having first obtained preclearance from the Attorney
General of the United States or the District Court for the District of
Columbia.
Id. at 346 (original italic typeface omitted).
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attorneys' fees to encourage private enforcement. 10 9 Finally,
the report recognized that "[t]here is reason to believe that
minority citizens in other jurisdictions encounter discrimination in the electoral process."1 10 Although the Commission was
in the process of undertaking a study concerning the possible
inclusion of other jurisdictions under the Act, it strongly recommended that "Congress not await the Commission's forthcoming report before giving serious consideration to including
an amendment to the extension of the Voting Rights Act to
cover . . . minorities who, according to preliminary information, require the protection of this law."""
At the 1975 renewal hearings, Assistant Attorney General
Pottinger underscored the continuing impact of Allen by
pointing out that "most of our experience under § 5 has occurred within the past five years. Although 4,476 voting
changes have been submitted under Section 5 since 1965,...
[a]bout 93% of all changes have been submitted since
1970.112 Conceding that administration of Section 5 had
proved to be "more complex than was imagined in 1965,"'113
Pottinger attempted to defend the Department's record by
addressing the criticisms contained in the Civil Rights Commission report. With respect to the allegations of noncompliance, the Assistant Attorney General testified that an extensive departmental staff review of all state election laws in a
number of Section 5 jurisdictions had been initiated to uncover changes that had not been submitted,1 4 and the Federal
109 Id. at 353.
11

Id. at 356.
Id. (original italic typeface omitted). This study was never completed because

of insufficient personnel to perform the onerous task of analyzing voting practices in
each state. Telephone conversation with Thelma Grevins, U.S. Comm'n on Civil
Rights (March 27, 1981). Commissioner Robert S. Rankin concurred in the report's
recommendations, "not because some irregularities still exist in the South and elsewhere-to some extent they exist nationwide-but for the improvements that have
resulted from this act." TEN YEARs

AFTER,

supra note 78, at 363.

..
2 Extension of the Voting Rights Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and ConstitutionalRights of the House Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 169
(1975) [hereinafter referred to as 1975 House Hearings] (testimony of J. Stanley Pot-

tinger, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division).
1

Id. at 170.
1975 House Hearings, supra note 112, at 170 (testimony of Assistant Attorney Genral Pottinger).
"4
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Bureau of Investigation had been asked "to determine
whether changes relating to voting may have been adopted in
a manner such as ordinance, resolution, etc., which may not
be reflected in the state statutes.111 5 Pottinger acknowledged

that there were "quite a number of unsubmitted changes" and
revealed the results of a preliminary review: 116

Number of
Unsubmitted
State
Changes
Alabama
70
Arizona
9
Georgia
158
16
Louisiana

State
Mississippi
North Carolina
South Carolina
Virginia

Number of
Unsubmitted
Changes
14
15
34
2

Because of the Department's perception of a trend "in the
nonsubmitting direction," annual and semiannual audits were
thought likely to be forthcoming.117 In Pottinger's estimation

the problem was remediable, 1" 8 and he rejected as too "punitive" the Civil Rights Commission's proposal for the imposition of civil penalties, a process he described as "get[ting]
money penalties against Governors ....

"119

Other portions of Pottinger's testimony indicate agreement with the view of the Civil Rights Commission that activity proscribed by Section 5 was not endemic to covered jurisdictions. Even though the extent of "wholesale deprivations in
the black or chicano" communities was minimal in 1975 as
215

Id.

11 Id. at 301. See also 1975 Senate Hearings,supranote 34, at 583 (testimony of
Assistant Attorney General Pottinger).
117 1975 House Hearings, supra note 112, at 301 (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Pottinger).
, The Senate Subcommittee received the following assurance:
But we believe that we can handle [the problem] with the resources we
have. It is true that this review has turned up a lot of different information
that must be reviewed by attorneys in our division, and they are working
hard without any real complaints. But I can tell you that late at night we
are encountering more lawyers, perhaps from voting rights section, working
on these matters very diligently, in order to make resolutions of each of
them.
1975 Senate Hearings,supra note 34, at 563.
"9 1975 House Hearings,supra note 112, at 298 (testimony of Assistant Attorney General Pottinger).

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69

compared with ten years earlier, "in parts of California, Ari-

zona, Colorado, New York, maybe New Jersey,.. . problems
do exist.1 120 Although the Department was powerless under
the Act to address registration and voting difficulties encountered by minorities in certain portions of New York,'21 striking similarities were perceived between "racial gerrymanders"
in Mississippi and in a portion of New York subject to Section
5.122 Despite this observation, Pottinger advocated an extension of the Act in order to allow Section 5 jurisdictions to establish in3 1981 "that they are now on a par with Northern
2
States.'

The Section 5 portion of the Report issued by the Senate
Judiciary Committee focused upon data compiled over the

ten-year period with respect to submissions and Department
1975 Senate Hearings,supra note 34, at 567 (testimony of Assistant Attorney
General Pottinger).
2

21 See id. at 596.

Pottinger and Senator Tunney engaged in the following exchange:
Senator TUNNEY. What about the kind of gerrymandering that takes
place where there may be a relatively large concentration of blacks and that
community is split up into, say, five districts, guaranteeing that there is a
relatively small minority of blacks in each one of the districts? ...
Mr. POTTINGER. Oh, yes, clearly. Incidentally, [an assistant] has
pointed out [an exhibit demonstrating this kind of districting in Mississippi] ... that is very similar to the problem we encountered in New York

122

Id. at 553. As an example of such activity in northern jurisdictions, an objection letter
was placed in the record which revealed the following:
First, with respect to the Kings County congressional redistricting, the
lines defining district 12 and surrounding districts appear to have the effect
of overly concentrating black neighborhoods into district 12, while simultaneously fragmenting adjoining black and Puerto Rican concentrations into
the surrounding majority white districts. We have not been presented with
any compelling justification for such configuration and our own analysis
reveals none. Moreover, it appears that other rational and compact alternative districting could achieve population equality without such an effect.
Similarly, in the Kings County senate and assembly plans.., the minority population appears to be concentrated into districts 53, 54, 55 and
56, while minority neighborhoods adjoining these districts are diffused into
a number of other districts.
Id. at 667 (letter from J. Stanley Pottinger to George D. Zuckerman, Assistant Attorney General of New York, April 1, 1974). For the subsequent history of the legal
impact of this objection, see United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144
(1977).
123 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 34, at 552.
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objections 124 and concluded that "past experience ought not
to be ignored in terms of assessing the future need for the
Act.' 1 25 From this premise the conclusion logically followed
that "objections [previously] entered. . . to Section 5 submis-

sions

clearly bespeak

the

continuing

need

for

[the]

preclearance mechanism."'1 28 Quoting Pottinger's testimony

with approval, the Report indicated that coverage through the
1980 Decennial Census was deemed critical because even
though "[§ 5] has been effective in preventing discrimination[,] . . .it has never been completely complied with in the
covered jurisdictions[,] and ... the guarantees it provides are

more significant to the
country than the slight interference to
27
the federal system."1

Dissenting committee members pointed to what they considered to be the slight "evidential value" of the original criteria used in determining which areas would be subject to Section 5, concluding:
All of us would support a voting rights law applying equally
to all citizens throughout the country in which the presumptions were the same for all States and political subdivisions,
but believe it is unfair to make the States covered by the
temporary legislation assume the burden of proof of their
128
innocence of any violation of voting rights ....

This concern with the limited extent of the Section's ju12, S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1975). The data revealed that
during that period the Department had objected to 163 of the 4,476 submissions. Id.
125 Id. at 18.
126 Id. at 16.
127Id. at 18 (quoting testimony of Assistant Attorney General Pottinger). This
conclusion, however, is incompatible with the Supreme Court's characterization of § 5
as a "substantial departure" from the traditional notions of federalism. See note 4
supra for the Court's comment on the section.
The House Report adopted an analysis similar to that of the Senate, concluding
that § 5 "has contributed to the gains thus far achieved in minority political participation, and... serves to insure that progress not be destroyed through new procedures and techniques. Now is not the time to remove those preclearance protections
from such limited and fragile success." H.R. REP. No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1975).
12 Id. at 73 (separate views of Senators Eastland, McClellan, Thurmond and
Scott).
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risdiction manifested itself in activity on the Senate floor.1 9
Senator Stennis of Mississippi contrasted the large number of
black elected officials in covered jurisdictions to the number
of such officials in the rest of the nation 3 0 and introduced a
1 31
bill to amend Section 5 to allow for nationwide coverage.
The proposal was objected to on the ground that requiring
preclearance from every jurisdiction in the country "would
mean that the Justice Department's resources would be
strained beyond limits in trying to evaluate every city council,
every county board of supervisors ordinance, and every State
13 2
legislative law that was passed.
Notwithstanding President Ford's recommendation that
Section 5's protection be extended to all citizens of the United
States since "what is right for fifteen states is right for fifty
states" '3 3 and despite accusations that the stance of those opposed to nationwide coverage was grounded upon the fact that
129 The House debates followed a similar pattern. 121 CONG. REc. 16241-92;
16763-87; 16880-917 (1975).
130 Senator Stennis noted:

Mississippi has 191 black elected officials. I say that proves participation better than any other single statistic could, and more black elected
officials than any State in the Nation except Michigan, which is much
larger, and they have only 194 as compared to 191 in Mississippi.
Here are the specifics on some other States. California has only 132
black elected officials. It is the highest populated State in the Nation. New
York, the second highest population in the Nation, only 174. Illinois, only
152.
121 CONG. REc. 24108 (1975). See notes 34-41 supra and accompanying text for extensive treatment of such data.
131 The amendment was described as a "re-run" of a previous proposal by Senators Talmadge and Nunn. Compare 121 CONG. REc. 24139 (1975) (Talmadge amendment) with id. at 24220 (Stennis amendment). Arguments for nationwide coverage
were premised on, among other things, fifteenth amendment litigation arising in Indiana, New York, Hawaii and Illinois, and the fact that low black voter registration
existed in many areas of the country. Id. at 24139-41.
'"Id.
at 24142 (remarks of Senator Tunney).
'"
Id. at 24220 (letter from President Ford to Senate Majority Leader Mansfield,
July 21, 1975). In his letter, President Ford stated:
Numerous civil rights leaders have pointed out that substantial numbers of Black citizens have been denied the right to vote in many of our
large cities in areas other than the seven Southern states where the present
temporary provisions apply. Discrimination in voting in any part of this
nation is equally undesirable.

A
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"other States do not want to have to clear their voting laws
with the Attorney General,"' 13 ' the amendment was tabled by

a vote of fifty-eight to thirty-eight. 135 The Senate rejected a
subsequent bill offered by Senator Nunn incorporating nationwide application by a vote of forty-eight to forty-one,'3
with the opposition again observing that "it would be impossible for the Attorney General to go to court and preclear all
the districts ' 137 and arguing that "[t]he effect would obviously

be that it would be impossible for the Attorney General to do
it, and we would not even have a Voting Rights Act."138
Hence, with no enlightened proposals for the enhancement of
the administrative process, Section 5 mechanisms remained
1 39

unchanged.

Concern with the efficacy of administrative preclearance
outlined above remains viable today. An examination of data
from the past six years reveals a steady increase in the rate of
submissions accompanied by a constant decrease in the per13,Id. at 24229 (remarks of Senator Johnston). Senator Ribicoff of Connecticut,
in support of the amendment, noted:
On February 9, 1970, the same problem was before the U.S. Senate on
the question of busing, and at that time I thought it was only eminently fair
that the entire Nation should have the same rules ....
I think if we are ever going to have equity and understanding in this
Nation, we cannot have one set of rules for one section of the country and
another set of rules for another section of the country. The North should be
willing to be bound by the same rules as the South.
Id. at 24221. See also id. at 23738-39 (Senator Javitts expressing pleasure that certain
portions of New York were covered).
,35Id. at 24240.
136Id. at 24766-69.
,37Id. at 24768 (remarks of Senator Brooke).
138Id. (remarks of Senator Brooke).
s That the procedure had already reached the point of breaking down and/or
becoming subject to abuse was also a point of reference during the debates. See, e.g.,
212 CONG. REc. 24119-20 (1975) (Senator Nunn accusing the Department of being the
cause for a lost election by a black candidate); id. at 24705 (Senator Scott describing
the "harassment implicit in a scenario where over 2,200 submissions have been made
by Virginia with only eight objections entered"); id. at 24729 (Senator Allen questioning the effectiveness of the Act when there had been only 163 objections out of 4,476
submissions); id. at 24732 (enlargement of alcove near registrar's office required
preclearance; hallway could not be widened for 60 days); id. at 24733 (detailed list of
de minimis changes having to be precleared).
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centage of objections. 140
Year

Submitted
Changes

Objections
Interposed

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

2,078
7,472
4,007
4,675
4,750
7,340

138
151
104
49
45
51

%
Objections
6.64
2.02
2.59
1.04
.94
.69

Indeed, the deluge of submissions provoked the following
analysis by Justice Powell:
[N]o senior officer in the Justice Department-much less
the Attorney General-could make a thoughtful, personal
judgment on an average of twenty-five preclearance petitions per day. Thus, important decisions made on a democratic basis.., are finally judged by unidentifiable employees of a federal bureaucracy, usually without anything
14 1
resembling an evidentiary hearing.
As noted earlier, the limited judicial review afforded covered jurisdictions has resulted in a restricted utilization of
that alternative.'4 2 Furthermore, administrative review of Section 5 submissions often takes place in the face of approaching elections whose occurrence is contingent upon the Department's determination. 1 43 These realities combine to render
crucially important the decisions made by these "unidentifiable employees" of the Justice Department. This process is
equally critical to the interests of minorities in light of the
140

141

See Appendix infra.
446 U.S. at 205 n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See also

438 U.S. 190, 201 n.6 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Even if the Attorney General

had no duties other than those imposed on him by § 5, one might doubt whether it
would be possible for him to pass judgment, with care and sensitivity, upon each
change in election laws or procedures submitted for his approval.")
142 See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited
utilization of the judicial alternative.
1'
See, e.g., 430 U.S. at 169 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that elected officials' compliance with Department suggestion that state and assembly districts include 65% minority populations was "prompted by the necessity of preventing interference with the upcoming 1974 election").

1980-81]

A

TIME FOR REVISION

plenary authority afforded the Attorney General's decision.
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Morris v. Gressette,'4
the decision of the Department is not subject to review. With
respect to a decision not to object to a proposed electoral adjustment, "it matters not whether the Attorney General fails
to object because he misunderstands his legal duty ... ; because he loses the submission; or because he seeks to subvert
the Voting Rights Act" 145 for, under all circumstances, the decision is unreviewable.
With the Department's decision-making process now virtually immune from judicial intervention, it is critical that the
procedures employed by the Department in performing the
preclearance function be closely evaluated. As a congressional
"afterthought," this delegation of authority is practically
without legislative history. 14 6 It is nonetheless indisputable
that present administrative practices are markedly divergent
from those that could have been reasonably foreseen by Congress in 1965.
The Department has adopted the same standards for review as those employed by the District of Columbia District
Court in declaratory judgment actions.1 47 As such, the administrative preclearance procedure now requires review of the
multitude of political, social, economic and legal criteria employed by that court1 48 to determine whether the purpose/ef144 432 U.S. 491 (1977).

,45Id. at 508 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"I' See notes 66-71 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the origins
and legislative development of administrative preclearance.
147 Section 51.39 of the Department's regulations provides in pertinent part:
(a) Section 5 provides for submission to the Attorney General as an
alternative to the seeking of a declaratory judgment from the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia. Therefore, the Attorney General shall
make the same determination that would be made by the court in an action
for a declaratory judgment under Section 5 ....
(b) Guided by the relevant judicial decisions, the Attorney General
shall base a determination on a review of material presented by the submitting authority, relevant information provided by individuals or groups, and
the results of any investigation conducted by the Department of Justice.
46 Fed. Reg. 878 (1981).
148 The District of Columbia court now refers to what it calls "voluminous evidence" needed when cases are heard under § 5. Rome v. United States, 472 F. Supp.
at 244.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69

fect standard has been met. To amass pertinent information
For purposes of discerning effect, the court engages in a highly critical review
reminiscent of decisions before Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). See, e.g., White
v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1972); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973)
(en banc), aff'd on other grounds sub. nom., East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1975). But see Lodge v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1981).
The starting point for this examination is a review of basic data. This includes registration by race, Hale County v. United States, 496 F. Supp. at 1207; City of Rome v.
United States, 472 F. Supp. at 224; Wilkes County v. United States, 450 F. Supp. at
1173; and cartographic presentations demonstrating, among other things, locations
and/or concentrations of minorities within the submitting jurisdiction, Donnell v.
United States, C.A. No. 78-0392 (D.D.C. July 31, 1979), af'd mem., 444 U.S. 1059
(1980); Mississippi v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1979).
Thereafter, a sensitive, in-depth inquiry is undertaken in order to evaluate and
make findings on such issues as: the electoral history of the political subdivision prior
to the proposed change, 496 F. Supp. at 1208; 472 F. Supp. at 223-24; 450 F. Supp. at
1173; barriers to registration prior and subsequent to 1965, 496 F. Supp. at 1211; 472
F. Supp. at 224; 450 F. Supp. at 1176; barriers to voting, including an analysis of
educational levels of minorities and their occupational and economic status, and conclusions reached-if needed-with respect to reduced participation in the electoral
process, 496 F. Supp. at 1213-14; 472 F. Supp. at 224-26; 450 F. Supp. at 1176; barriers to the election of minority candidates, including statistical evaluations of elections
in which blacks have participated as candidates, 496 F. Supp. at 1212-14; 472 F.
Supp. at 225; 450 F. Supp. at 1174; the existence of bloc voting, 496 F. Supp. at 121213; 472 F. Supp. at 226-27; 450 F. Supp. at 1174; election requirements which may
impede the effective utilization of the franchise, 472 F. Supp. at 221; current ability
of minority voters to affect the outcome of elections, id. at 225; racial composition of
the governmental workforce, id.; responsiveness or the lack thereof by elected officials
to the needs of the minority community, 496 F. Supp. at 1212; 472 F. Supp. at 225;
and the history of minority appointments to office, 472 F. Supp. at 225; 450 F. Supp.
at 1174.
The observations derived from these inquiries are synthesized for the purpose of
determining whether there is a "'sweeping and pervasive' [history] of past discrimination and a present disproportion of minority electoral participation." 496 F. Supp.
at 1216. If such a finding is made, and if a covered jurisdiction is unable to show that
its "elected officials [have remedied] the effects of [past] discrimination," 450 F.
Supp. at 1176, then voting changes which, on their face, would seem to be devoid of
adverse impact are proscribed. See 496 F. Supp. at 1206 (adjustment from district to
at-large election violates § 5 even though blacks have a majority of the voting age
population); Donnell v. United States, C.A. No. 78-0392 (D.D.C. July 31, 1979), aff'd
mem., 444 U.S. 1059 (1980); 490 F. Supp. at 575 (65% minority population voting
districts required to give blacks an opportunity to elect candidate of their choice).
But see 425 U.S. at 130.
Finally, in determining whether a change violates the "purpose" proscription, the
District of Columbia court employs two divergent analyses. The first adopts the current constitutional tests for purposeful discrimination, e.g., historical background and
the sequence of events leading up to the decision. Compare Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) with 496 F. Supp.
at 1218; 472 F. Supp. at 243. The second initially involves a cartographic analysis to
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and to evaluate its content, the Department maintains within
its Voting Rights Section a "submission unit" that has primary responsibility for the preclearance process. This unit
consists of one attorney, a paraprofessional director and
eleven paraprofessionals, sometimes referred to as paralegal
analysts, 14 9 and is instructed to look for "suspicious type
changes,"15 which include "at-large elections, reductions in
the number of polling places, changes in the location of polling places and redistricting." 151 Among the staff's responsibilities is investigation of motive and impact, which in turn is
largely accomplished by "telephone calls to on-site persons.1 152 Information independent of the submission is gath-

ered from minority interest groups and other interested individuals within the submitting jurisdiction15 and in turn is
assimilated in a decision-making process relying upon "the
preparation and analysis of... demographic and legal information [which] is in the hands of paraprofessionals who possess neither demographic/statistical skills nor legal traindetermine if minority populations have been "diluted or fragmented." Donnell v.
United States, C.A. No. 78-0392 (D.D.C. July 31, 1979), aff'd mem., 444 U.S. 1059
(1980); 490 F. Supp. at 569. If such is the case, an unarticulated balancing test is
employed which weighs the explanations offered for a redistricting or reapportionment scheme against alternative plans that do not result in such fragmentation. If the
justifications offered for a plan entailing fragmentation are weak, and significant vote
dilution is perceived, the proposed change will be determined to be motivated by an
improper purpose which abridges the right to vote on account of color. Donnell v.
United States, C.A. No. 78-0392 (D.D.C. July 31, 1979), affd mem., 444 U.S. 1059
(1980).
149 REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, VOTING RIGHTS

ACT-ENFORCEMENT NEEDS STRENGTHENING 54 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as GAO
REPORT], reprinted in GAO Report Hearings,supra note 44, at 65-155. A second "itigative unit" employs 1 assistant for litigation, 13 attorneys and 2 paraprofessionals.

Id. The "submission unit" employs "law students, .. . college graduates who qualified for ... GS 5-10 level job[s], and others [who] have been clerical employees." H.
BALL, D. KRANE & T. LAUTH, COMPROMSnSED COMPLIANCE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS AcT 86 (Unpub. ed. 1981) [hereinafter referred to as COMPROMISED
COMPLIANCE]. Hiring criteria include intelligence, willingness to deal with people, and

writing ability. Id. at 86-87.
'50 COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE, supra note 149, at 91 (citing interview with David
Hunter, Staff Attorney, Voting Section, Civil Rights Division, September 1, 1977).
151 Id.
152

Id.

,53 Id. at 90. The Department maintains a "permanent registry" of persons and

groups that desire notice of submissions. 46 Fed. Reg. 877 (1981).
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ing. ' 15 4 Thereafter, the paralegal assistants make the "initial
(and normally upheld) determinations with respect to whether
or not the proposed change has a discriminatory purpose or
effect." 155
A recent review of the submission unit's performance by
the Government Accounting Office (GAO) revealed that "59
percent of [sampled] changes . . . did not have all data required by Federal regulations."1 5 6 In addition, inefficiency of
the unit was found inasmuch as "some submission files could
not be located and data inaccuracies . . limited the use of
the Department's computer system which maintains data on
identified changes."1 57 Indeed, a GAO representative testified
that staff members "have no way of managing the data they
get in from the jurisdictions; who reported-who gave their
objections, who submitted submissions, who made changes
that they didn't submit." 5 8
Utilization of a "permanent registry" (a compilation of
individuals and groups interested in submissions) 59 and other
techniques for obtaining relevant information from minority
groups was likewise found inadequate.160 After noting that a
review of 271 randomly selected submissions showed that only
fifty-five percent contained comments by interested groups or
persons, the Report commented upon the followup with respect to those groups or persons: "[T]he Department's [own]
records showed that individuals or groups commenting were
informed of the review decision in less than 1 percent of the
cases sampled. Consequently, minority groups and individuals
may not have adequate information to detect changes implemented despite the Department's objections."" Similarly, re154 COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE,

supra note 149, at 90. See note 149 supra for a

description of the unit's hiring criteria.
1 Id. A paralegal's decision to object to a submission is, however, given closer
scrutiny by superiors than a decision not to object. Id. at 92. Thus, error is more
likely in a "no objection" finding. Id. (citing Hunter interview).
158 GAO REPORT, supra note 149, at 17.
157 Id. at 18.
158 GAO Report Hearings, supra note 44, at 13.
159

See note 153 supra for reference to this registry.

160 GAO REPORT, supra note 149, at 15-16.
262

Id. at 16.
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sponses from a sampling of minority interest groups as to
their impressions of the effectiveness of Section 5 revealed the
following: thirty-five percent had no knowledge of Department preclearance procedures; ninety percent were not on the
mailing list, and over half were unaware of its existence;
twenty-five percent knew of significant changes that had not
been submitted; and eighty percent had rarely or never been
consulted by Department representatives."' Indeed, "[tihis
sense of removal from the decision process was reinforced by
the minority respondents' belief that [Department] approval
of changes opposed by minority leaders was a more important
3L S
problem than a covered jurisdiction's failure to submit.'
Given the fact that an immense number of submissions
are received by the Department and must be reviewed by a
small number of personnel within only sixty days, 1" each
passing day becomes critical. Although in Georgia v. United
States 16 5 the Supreme Court agreed with the Department's
argument that the 60-day period may be tolled by a request
for additional information, the process has been described as
"hectic, with letters usually being mailed at the last possible
moment,"'0 8 and the request for additional information is
often reserved as the Department's "trump card.'1 7 The GAO
Report made corroborative findings as follows:
[I]n about 6.8 percent of the submissions reviewed, a Department decision was not rendered until at least 100 days
from the initial receipt of the submission.
Despite [the requirement that submissions be handled
expeditiously] over 50 percent of . . .requests [for additional information] were made on the 60th day after receipt
of the initial submissions, over 70 percent were made at
'2

COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE, supra note 149, at 193 (reviewing results of GAO

survey).
163 Id.
14 In 1980, the submission unit received 7,340 submissions, or approximately 20
per working day. See Appendix, infra. Thus, to avoid a backlog of submissions,
paraprofessionals must rule on more than two submissions each day. See note 149
supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the submission unit.
165 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
166

COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE,

617
Id. at 120.

supra note 149, at 91.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69

least 55 days after receipt, and only 2 percent within 30

days.
In over 50 percent of the cases reviewed, the Department did not notify jurisdictions of its decision until at least
56 days after it had complete information. Notification was
given within 30 days for fewer than one out of every six
68
changes.1

In addition to the GAO Report, several reported decisions
confirm the fact that the Department has encountered difficulties in complying with the time limitation. Not only have
objections been imposed on the last day, 6 9 but the Department has found it necessary to argue, unsuccessfully, that
Georgia allows tolling periods for more than one request for
additional information. 70
Although it has expended a great deal of professional energy in other areas, 71 the Department remains plagued by the
1I GAO REPORT, supra note 149, at 18.
169 E.g., 435 U.S. at 116 n.6 (objection on 60th day); McRae v. Bd. of Educ., 491

F. Supp. 30, 33 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (objection entered within statutory time frame since
day submission received not included in 60-day period).
170 See Garcia v. Uvalde County, 455 F. Supp. 101, 105-06 (W.D. Tex. 1978), afi'd
mem., 439 U.S. 1059 (1979) (objection interposed 205 days after submission; held, 60day period commences when "the submitting authority complies with the Attorney
General's request for additional information" and the "Attorney General may not
further postpone the commencement of that period by requesting still more information or by repeating his request for information which the submitting authority has
already stated to be unavailable"); Woods v. Hamilton, 473 F. Supp. 641 (D.S.C.
1979) (objection entered 210 days after receipt of all available information; same
holding); Garza v. Gates, 482 F. Supp. 1211, 1213 n.3 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (objection
interposed two years after the Department was notified that requested information
was not available; held, based on Garcia and other prior reported decisions, reapportionment at issue became effective 60 days after response to the Department, the
court stating that "[t]he lapse of [such a long time] suggests an incredible and inexcusable lapse of diligence on the part of the Department").
"IIn the intervening years, the Department devoted substantial litigative energy
to establish the proposition that "court ordered" reapportionment should, in some
instances, be integrated with the preclearance process. McDaniel v. Sanchez, 49
U.S.L.W. 4615 (U.S. June 2, 1981) (proposals reflecting policy choices of elected representatives-regardless of constraints limiting the choices available-require
preclearance); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535 (1978) (divided court distinguishing
between legislative and judicial plans; plan which is prepared and becomes effective
as a result of court order can qualify as legislative judgment of covered jurisdiction);
Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 496 n.8 (1977) (distinguishing, for purposes of
preclearance, plans adopted by a covered jurisdiction in constitutional litigation "on
[their] own authority" as compared to that which is court ordered); Connor v. John-
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continuing serious problem of covered jurisdictions failing to
preclear all voting changes. The GAO Report's conclusion on
this issue is unmistakably clear:
The Voting Rights Act has been in effect for over 12
years, yet there is little assurance that covered States and
localities are complying with the act's preclearance provision. We found that the Department of Justice had limited
formal procedures for determining that voting changes were
submitted for review as required by the act or for determining whether jurisdictions
implemented changes over the De17 2
partment's objection.

The Report also reveals that the Federal Bureau of Invesson, 402 U.S. 690, 691 (1971) ("A [reapportionment] decree of the United States District Court is not within reach of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act").
The Department also argues that state court decrees affecting voting are subject
to preclearance. Compare Williams v. Sclafani, 444 F. Supp. 895, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(questioning constitutionality of any requirement which would require executive officers of states to submit state court decrees to the Department) with MacCoon,
supra note 7, at 118 (attorney employed by Voting Rights Section arguing that
nonreviewability of state court decisions creates an "unwarranted gap" in
enforcement).
Alleged illegal activity occurring in state elections is also contended to be a
change subject to preclearance. In United States v. Saint Landry Parish School Bd.,
601 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1979), the court was faced with an argument by the Department that alleged vote-buying of minority voters was a "change" and, not having
been precleared, required that an injunction issue from a previously-convened local
three-judge court. Labeling the claim "frivolous," the court concluded:
Surely Congress did not intend the Attorney General and the district court
for the District of Columbia to waste their time considering voting procedures that a state does not wish to enact or administer. But this would be
the result if we required the state to submit for approval, as a new voting
procedure, those actions of state officials which conflict with the state's required procedures.
Id. at 864. See GAO Report Hearings, supra note 44, at 162 (letter from Kevin D.
Rooney, Assistant Attorney General for Administration, to Senator Ribicoff, June 7,
1978) (position of Department that such activity violates Act). See also Miller v. Danies, 509 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Department argument rejected on basis that it
"would be pointless to require the state to seek approval for practices that it condemns and that it has no desire to enact or administer").
172 GAO REPORT, supra note 149, at 10. See also id. at 12 (Voter Education Project allegedly identifying 44 significant unsubmitted election laws in Georgia between
August 1965 and March 1976); id. at 13 (reviewing data submitted by Department to
the Congress at 1975 extension hearings); id. at 12 (finding that, as of November
1976, five covered jurisdictions made no submissions, and, in seven other states having covered subdivisions, there were less than 12 submissions each).
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tigation "identified 102 unsubmitted changes [on behalf of the
Department] of which 60 were still unsubmitted as of October
1976.' ' 173 Moreover, although "[the] Attorney General objected to 257 of the reported 13,433 submissions . . . the De-

partment has not initiated formal monitoring procedures for
making sure that jurisdictions do not implement a voting
change over the Department's objection.

17

4

A study parallel-

ing that of the GAO indicates that perhaps the GAO Report
even understates the problem. 17 5 Continuing activity in the
e and a comlower courts dealing with unsubmitted changesM~
pilation by former Texas Representative Barbara Jordon listing sixty counties and 170 Texas cities that have never submitted a change 17 7 evince the fact that the problem of

unprecleared changes is a significant one. 7 8
There is also a growing sense of frustration by those who
perceive that the required adversarial and investigatory nature of the Department is becoming increasingly debilitated

174

Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.

175

COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE,

173

supra note 149, at 202-03 (41% of Georgia and

Mississippi county attorneys contacted have never submitted a voting change).
176 See, e.g., Dotson v. City of Indianola, 514 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Miss. 1981)
(three-judge court); Gamble v. Town of Clio, C.A. No. 80-456-N (M.D. Ala. March 5,
1981) (three-judge court).
177 GAO Report Hearings, supra note 44, at 189-90.
178 With respect to the GAO's criticisms, the Department's response reflected
that no changes are anticipated:
We do not believe our procedures for monitoring future compliance
with our objections require revision. We have a registry of 408 organizations
and individuals who are notified of submissions. Those who comment on a
submission are then notified if we interpose an objection. These groups and
persons are in the best position to become aware of implementation of such
changes and bring them to our attention.
GAO Report Hearings,supra note 44, at 157-58. (letter from Kevin D. Rooney, Assistant Attorney General for Administration, to Senator Ribicoff, (June 7, 1978)).
Turning to other aspects of the Report, the Department did admit to missing
files, id. at 159, as well as to some disorganization. With respect to the latter, an
"administrator" had been hired to improve "record-keeping and filing procedures."
Id. at 158. Issues relating to rendering preclearance decisions without all necessary
data having been submitted, and not handling the submissions within the 60-day period, were dealt with by a conclusion that perhaps the GAO did not fully understand
the procedures employed, id., and that full utilization of the statutory period (and the
Georgia extension) was necessary in many instances "for a full and adequate analysis." Id. at 159.

1980-81]

A TIME FOR REVISION

by "professional" relationships established between Depart-

ment attorneys and local officials. 171 Those who take this
point of view perceive a negotiating process between "fraternal professionals" which, while conducive to Section 5 compliance, results in enforcement at a "suboptimal level."' 80 The
problems posed by this relationship are indicated in this discussion of the process:
[Tihe almost unanimous selection by covered jurisdictions of the administrative procedure option ...

when they

seek to comply with the preclearance requirement is indicative of their preference for the kinds of outcomes which are
obtainable through the lawyer-bureaucrat bargaining process. These enforcement practices when coupled with the inability of the Department of Justice to detect many of the
unsubmitted voting changes, or to follow up effectively to

make certain that jurisdictions do not implement changes to
which the Department had [sic] objected, suggest an enforcement pattern in which state and local governments retain a considerable amount of discretion over the manner in
which they exercise their reserved power to conduct
elections.181
The Civil Rights Commission lends credence to this conclusion when it states that while it is "evident that minorities
still need the protection of the Voting Rights Act,' 8 2" the unfortunate "lack of enforcement by the executive branch of
Government" remains a problem.' 3s
The nationwide aspects of voter discrimination have also
affected the Department's activities in the last five years. Responding to a portion of the critique by the GAO as to the
manner in which it utilizes its professional resources,'" the
supra note 149, at 184.
Id. at 130.
181 Id. at 160 (footnote omitted).
179 COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE,
180

.8. UNITED STATES CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS: 1979, at
33 (1980).
181 Id. at 37.
184 The Report noted "limited litigative efforts" on the part of the professional
staff, finding-among other things-that "only 1 of the 13 staff attorneys [had] represented the Department in court on more than six cases," although 7 had been in the
section from 1 to 3 years. GAO REPORT, supra note 149, at 28. Indeed, with respect to
evaluating litigation activity it was discovered that no listing of cases in which the
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Department pointed out that since "Section 5 does not reach
all jurisdictions.

. .

, litigation is required to challenge many

dilutive apportionment plans." 1 5 It noted that four constitutional dilution suits had been filed since 1976, that sixteen
were under "serious investigation" and that a study had been
completed of "40 northern and western states to uncover dilution problems."1 6 As a result, an investigation of "three
51 7
northern cities" was soon to be undertaken.
IV. THE PROPOSAL

The most salient conclusions to be derived from the foregoing examination are easily summarized. First, the present
avenue of judicial preclearance is totally inadequate. Second,
the administrative preclearance alternative has sufficiently
served the interests of neither covered jurisdictions nor minority citizens. Third, both methodological weaknesses and
political vulnerabilities of the administrative remedy render
the decisions of the Attorney General highly suspect from the
viewpoint of covered jurisdictions and minority citizens alike.
Fourth, as statistics have shown, an ever-increasing rate of
submissions for preclearance can be expected in the future.
This burden will remain insurmountable if the Department
continues in its role as the only viable avenue for
preclearance, a state of affairs incompatible with the expeditious, considered treatment envisioned by the formulators of
the remedy. Fifth, the problem of unsubmitted changes continues unabated, and the Department appears unable to devise a monitoring mechanism capable of assuring compliance
with the Act. Finally, the question whether covered jurisdictions implement electoral changes despite objection from the
Attorney General remains unanswered.
section had been involved was available, thus necessitating an independent review by
the GAO. Id. at 74 n."a". As subsequently described, "the [GAO] report ... has a
listing of voting section litigation. And just for illustration, our [the GAO's] staff had
to develop that list. No place in the Department of Justice was there such a list
compiled or anything like that." GAO Report Hearings,supra note 44, at 14.
15 GAO Report Hearings,supra note 44, at 162 (emphasis added) (testimony of
John Ols of the GAO).
18 Id.
287 Id.
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The Department was surely correct when, in responding
to the GAO Report, it argued that too much was being expected from the Voting Rights Section and that the Act, as
presently structured, "relies to a considerable extent on voluntary action by the covered jurisdictions" as well as "private
lawsuits [for] effective enforcement."1 8 8 Indeed, such conclusions merely restate in another form a critique made by a staff
attorney nearly a decade ago who, after reviewing the judicial
construction given Section 5, concluded that "the Attorney
General [was] playing a role in [its] enforcement... far be189
yond that originally envisioned."
Despite the serious flaws evident in this procedure, however, they in no way detract from the fundamental proposition that the social benefits generated by the preclearance requirement clearly outweigh its present inadequacies. Indeed,
the mere presence of preclearance has a deterring effect on
public officials who, but for its existence, would be far less
concerned with avoiding discriminatory actions resulting in
impediments to the effective utilization of the franchise by
minorities.
It is the authors' proposal that, with the exclusion of
states or political subdivisions having a de minimis percentage
of minorities, 9 0 Section 5 be amended to provide for nationwide application and that political units be required to bring a
declaratory judgment action in local United States District
Courts for preclearance of electoral alterations. The amended
statute would provide that any state or political subdivision
desiring to implement a voting change having a "potential for
discrimination," 191 be required, prior to such implementation,
188 Id. at 156 (letter from Kevin D. Rooney, Assistant Attorney General for Administration, to Senator Ribicoff, June 7, 1978). The Department did feel, however,
that it played a "substantial role in monitoring compliance." Id.
,81Roman, supra note 28, at 125.
190Compare note 41 supra with Roman, supra note 28, at 131 (the latter suggesting a cutoff at the "five or ten percent" level).
"' There are, of course, many arguments for statutorily curtailing the scope of
the Allen line of decisions. E.g., Roman, supra note 28, at 131. On a time/benefit
basis, however, legislative endeavors to define these instances would-at best-prove
unrewarding. Specifically, there can be no doubt that even minor changes carry the
proscribed "potential for discrimination" and can, in many instances, affect the outcome of elections. See, e.g., Voting Rights Renewal to Spark First in Congress, 39
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to file a complaint naming the United States as a defendant in
the United States District Court for the judicial district in
which the submitting jurisdiction is located. 192 The relief
sought would be identical to that currently found in Section 5
proceedings, namely, a declaration that the proposed change
does not "have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying the right to vote on the basis of race or color." The
burden of proof would continue to fall upon the submitting
political unit.
Upon filing the complaint, appropriate notice would be
required to inform interested parties other than the United
States that the political unit is proposing a change within the
scope of Section 5. This notice should take two forms: first,
publication in local newspapers for three consecutive weeks;
and second, actual service of the complaint upon interested
persons or organizations who could have their names placed in
a "permanent registry" to be kept in the office of each district
court clerk. Any person residing within the political subdivision or any organization existing therein desiring to object to
the proposed voting change would be allowed to intervene as a
matter of right within sixty days after publication or receipt
of the complaint.
Appended to the complaint should be that information
now required by regulations issued by the Attorney General. 193 The United States would be allowed sixty days to answer, with a tolling of the period occurring after one request
for additional information. This tolling period would also apply to private parties, and any supplemental information provided to the Department would be served on those persons or
organizations receiving the complaint. If the United States
fails to answer, and if no person or organization intervenes
CoNG. Q. 633, 637 (April 11, 1981) (38 polling places moved from predominantly black
district; change not announced until day of election). For a description of the political
pressures brought to bear in this situation to insure no interference from the Department of Justice, see COMPROMISED COMPLIANCE, supra note 149, at i-vii.
192 One consequence of this, of course, is to allow forum shopping, in certain
cases, e.g., statewide reapportionment. The automatic stay provision proposed in this
article will, however, diminish whatever benefits a covered jurisdiction would expect
to derive from this procedure.
193 See 46 Fed. Reg. 875-76 (1981).
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within the specified period, the court would enter an uncontested judgment allowing the jurisdiction to implement the
proposed change. The rendering of such judgment would not,
however, preclude subsequent constitutional challenges. Obviously, the judgment could be set aside as provided in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b),"' in which event the action
would be calendared for trial as though the allegations of the
complaint had been controverted in the first instance.
Preclearance actions would be given a priority setting in
the district court, with a statutory right of mandamus available to insure promptness, e.g., sixty days after the Section 5
issue is joined. Decisions adverse to the United States or intervening parties should be automatically stayed upon filing
notice of appeal, with an expedited appeal granted as a matter
of right. Expedited appeals should also be granted to submitting jurisdictions desiring review of adverse Section 5
decisions.
Moreover, if the defense should include constitutional
counterclaims, the Section 5 portion would be separated from
other issues that may be reserved for later determination. In
any case, resolution of the Section 5 issue would be appealable
by the aggrieved party on an expedited basis as an interlocutory order. Where the appellant or appellants are private parties, a cost-free transcript would be provided. Appellate courts
should handle Section 5 appeals on a priority identical to that
currently afforded criminal cases.1 95
The authors are convinced that the proposal and suggested guidelines for its implementation would facilitate more
expeditious and thoughtful resolution of the questions surrounding Section 5 changes in voting matters. In the first
place, it is likely that many petitions filed under the revised
procedure, absent any objection, can be disposed of sunmarily. In such cases, federal preclearance would be expeditiously obtained, with the political unit free to implement the
voting change upon reasonable notice to the public. The pro-

posed amendments would also allow a local district court to
104

FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (providing for setting aside judgment for mistakes, in-

advertance, excusable neglect, newly-discovered evidence, fraud, etc.).
10I

See FED. R. App. P. 45(b).
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determine all statutory and constitutional issues in one lawsuit, something that is now forbidden by Section 5.'9' More-

over, if the latest Department of Justice compilations are empirically sound19 7 (51 objections out of 7,340 submissions in
1980), the minimal increase in caseload for the federal judicial
system that this proposal would bring about is surely a small
price to pay for a procedure that insures more meaningful
participation by affected minorities in the preclearance
process.
Resolution of Section 5 conflicts would be further enhanced under this proposal since the burdens heretofore
placed upon the Department will be shared with those most
affected by the Act, namely, minority voters. Given the broad
90 The fact of the matter is that, in addition to § 5 issues, many cases present
fourteenth and fifteenth amendment claims. As a result the current process can, in
many instances, present a procedural morass. For example, the Senate Judiciary
Committee approved the following procedure:
A correct application of Section 5, for example, was demonstrated in
Gaillard v. Young . . . which involved the reapportionment of the City
Council of Charleston, S.C. The district court invalidated the existing apportionment plan on grounds of "population inequality" and then deferred
consideration of any new plan pending Section 5 review. A number of plans
were submitted to the Attorney General, who objected to all but one. That
one was then submitted to the local district court which concluded that the
plan would not meet the population equality requirments of the fourteenth
amendment. The court then invited the litigants in the reapportionment
case to present plans, and after selecting the one best meeting the population equality requirements of the fourteenth amendment, ordered that plan
submitted for Section 5 review. Only after the Attorney General decided
not to object to this last plan did the district court order it implemented.
S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1975). The Supreme Court approved the
Gaillardanalysis in McDaniel v. Sanchez, 49 U.S.L.W. 4615 n.28 (U.S. June 2, 1981).
In this situation, if the plan is developed in such a way as to call for § 5 review, see
note 171 supra, the stay-expedited appeal procedure would obviously be available.
9' Although the terminology employed may leave the point unclear, it is an honest attempt to reflect a continuing, serious concern of the authors. The Court's decision in Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 528 (1979), authorized a decision-making
process for § 5 submissions in which no reason need be given for objecting to a submission, i.e., a conclusion that the Attorney General "had not been persuaded" was
sufficient. Id. at 543 (White, J., dissenting). The decision to preclear is also unaccompanied by an explanation. Thus, not operating in a context of documented accountability, there is no way anyone can make a reasoned determination as to whether the
number of objections in any given year actually reflects how many submitted changes
were violative of § 5. Put another way, whether the objection rate should have been
more or less is a question impossible to answer.
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provision for intervention of outside parties, the protection of
minority interests will no longer hinge upon determinations
made by "unidentifiable employees" within the office of the
Attorney General. Moreover, with the United States retained
as a defendant, the expertise and experience of those attorneys in the Voting Rights Section can be employed where
they are most needed: in complex matters such as annexations, reapportionment and redistricting that "account for
over two-thirds of . . Section 5 objections."198 Finally, the
provision of an automatic stay coupled with the right to an
expedited appeal renders any decision adverse to the United
States or intervening minority parties by a "biased forum" totally meaningless since no change can be implemented until it
receives appellate approval. 19
An award of attorneys' fees is also critical to effective implementation of the proposal. Since "Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved,"2 00 the 1975 amendments included an incentive for
private parties to bring meritorious actions by allowing a

"IGAO Report Hearings, supra note 44, at 162 (letter from Kevin D. Rooney,
Assistant Attorney General for Administration, to Senator Ribicoff, June 7, 1978).
"' The proposal also carries with it the distinct benefit of terminating the threejudge court procedure currently employed. As one commentator pointed out ten years
ago, the procedure presents innumerable difficulties including "overcrowded docket;
disruption of judges' schedule; absence of intermediate appellate procedure; and burden on the Supreme Court." Ammerman, Three-Judge Courts: See How They Run,
52 F.R.D. 293, 304 (1971). In 1975 Congress recognized these shortcomings and repealed those provisions of the code which required the convening of a three-judge
court before declaring a state or federal statute unconstitutional. S. REP. No. 204,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1975) (legislative history of P.L. 94-281 which repealed 29
U.S.C. §§ 2281-82). In spite of Chief Justice Burger's suggestion that "[w]e should
totally eliminate the three-judge courts that disrupt district and circuit judges'
work," Remarks of Warren E. Burger before American Bar Association, San Francisco, Calif., Aug. 14, 1972, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1990,
Congress chose to retain the three-judge panel for § 5 cases.
It has been the experience of one of the authors that, given the sweeping reach of
Allen, the three-judge court normally upholds the single judge's decision for a temporary restraining order. Yet, as a matter of law, this may not be done until, at the
least, various papers are mailed among the various judges, or at the worst, a duplicative hearing is conducted by the full three-judge court.
200 S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 774, 807.
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court to assess a reasonable attorney's fee in such actions.2 0 1

This provision derives from the recognition that "[flee awards
are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate
these Federal rights."20 2 The Committee studying the proposed amendments found that
fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements
and federal statutes . . .are to be enforced. We find that

the effects of such fee awards are ancillary and incident to
securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are
an integral 20part
of the remedies necessary to obtain such
3
compliance.

As the Second Circuit noted:
Attorneys' fees are ... awarded ... to recompense

those who by helping to protect basic rights are thought to
have served the public interest. A principal purpose of the
legislation is to encourage people to seek judicial redress of
unlawful discrimination.
In short, imposition of full attorneys' fees is a useful
and needed tool of the court to fully protect plaintiffs' rights
as American citizens and voters ...

204

It must be noted, however, that the attorneys' fees provision is a two-edged sword inasmuch as fees may be imposed
against a private party, or his attorney, if intervention is
found to be "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless" or maintained purely for the purpose of harassment. 20 5 The attorneys'
201 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (1976) provides: "In any action or proceeding to enforce
the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs."
Passage of the provision was in response to testimony exemplified by the conclusion that, at least in one state, "twice as many lawsuits and possibly three times as
many lawsuits have been filed by private plaintiffs challenging racial discrimination
in voting and elections as have been filed by the Attorney General." 1975 Senate
Hearings, supra note 34, at 132 (testimony of Frank Parker, representing Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law).
202 S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE

CONG. & AD. NEws 774, 807.
203S. REP. No. 295, 94th

Cong., 1st Sess. 41, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 774, 808 (footnote omitted).
20,Torres v. Sachs, 538 F.2d 10, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1976).
205 Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1976). See also
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fees provision therefore operates to make certain that frivolous litigation will be minimal while at the same time encouraging the initiation by private parties of well-founded claims
of discriminatory disenfranchisement. 0°
Finally, this proposal contemplates that the problem of
noncompliance with the Act be addressed in traditionally equitable terms, thus forcing political units to realize that such
failures to obey the law inevitably pose threats of dire consequences both to the political unit and to its citizens. 0 7
Futhermore, it would seem that this problem will diminish because of two considerations. First, as noted earlier, there is
presently minimal participation by minorities in the
preclearance process as currently structured by the Department of Justice. Under the proposal, a substantial measure of
participation by minorities in the process should result in a
"brooding presence ' ' 20 8 ever ready to raise the noncompliance
issue in a readily-accessable forum. Second, familiarity with
the local district court as the forum in which all disputes may
be resolved by traditional means as opposed to the current
alien and distant administrative remedy should enhance participation in the preclearance process.
Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025, 1027-29 (2d Cir. 1979); Flora v. Moore,
461 F. Supp. 1104, 1119-22 (N.D. Miss. 1978), aff'd mem., 631 F.2d 730 (5th Cir.
1980).
206 See, e.g., 538 F.2d at 10 (award of $23,252); Donnell v. United States, C.A.
No. 78-0392 (D.D.C. February 24, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1471 (D.C. Cir.
April 23, 1981) (§ 5 case; award of $73,669.88 to private intervenors). See also Pugh v.
Rainwater, 465 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (award of $55,372.50); Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 431 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1301
(3d Cir. 1978) (award of $199,788.37).
20, See, e.g., Dotson v. City of Indianola, 514 F. Supp. at 397 (N.D. Miss. 1981)
(unless and until the City of Indianola, Mississippi obtains clearance of its four 196567 annexations in accordance with § 5, all future elections must be conducted on the
basis of the city boundaries as they existed before the unprecleared annexations were
made, and citizens residing in such annexed areas may not participate in future municipal elections either as electors or as candidates); Gamble v. Town of Clio, C.A. No.
80-456-N (M.D. Ala. March 5, 1981) (ordered government officials living in annexed
areas which were not precleared to be removed from office, and special elections were
ordered within the old municipal boundaries).
210 Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 122 (1974).
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CONCLUSION

The federal judiciary has historically been the guardian of
the constitutional rights of all citizens. In that capacity, no
more important business concerns the courts than the vital
function of shielding from unlawful state action every citizen's
right of franchise. It is time-indeed long past time-to inyoke the full authority of federal judges throughout the
United States in an effort to realize the fundamental objectives of Section 5. The process of administrative preclearance
represents an unfortunate failure on the part of the Congress
to utilize that segment of government traditionally vested
with the duty of preserving federal rights. The time for
change is now.
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